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, AND MODERN PERSPECTIVES ON PROGRESS 
INTRODUCTION 
It is currently in vogue in 
some circles to claim that 
Darwinian evolution violates a 
law of decreasing order in the 
universe, and therefore cannot 
have occurred (see Patterson 
1983). Proponents of this view 
define evolution as progressive 
change from simple to complex. 
Ironically, their view of the 
universe demands unidirectional 
change--in this case, degener- 
ation--far more than Darwinism 
demands progressive improve- 
ment. In fact, the argument that 
evolution means progress from 
simple to complex is a straw 
man in a neo-Darwinian context. 
So it is odd to see an anti- 
evolutionary argument, however 
weak in its own right, trying to 
knock it down. The anti- 
evolutionists' definition of 
evolution belongs to the 
nineteenth century. But not, 
significantly, to Charles Darwin. 
This definition of evolution 
is largely Spencerian. Darwin's 
contemporary Herbert Spencer 
did indeed view evolution as 
progress from simple to 
complex. He also claimed to 
have anticipated Darwin in the 
discovery of natural selection. 
He too had been reading 
Malthus; he too had derived 
from Malthus a principle of 
selection based on competition. 
But in reality, Spencer's 
selection differed from that of 
Darwin, as did his vision of 
evolutionary progress. In fact, 
ornithologist and evolutionary 
historian Ernst Mayr, in his 
treatise on the history of 
evolutionary biology, refused to 
admit any role for Spencer in 
the development of evolutionary 
biology (Mayr 1982). To Mayr, 
Spencer was merely a contem- 
porary of Darwin who had 
misconstrued biology in general 
and misapplied Darwinism in 
particular to social evolutionary 
change. He  was also a man who 
had received undue praise for 
his contributions to  evolutionary 
biology during his own lifetime 
(for example, Buckley 1892). 
Yet even before his death in 
1903 Spencer's reputation had 
considerably declined. 
Evolutionary biology was no 
longer Spencerian. In large 
part, Mayr insists, it never was. 
This negative appraisal of 
Spencer's impact on 
evolutionary biology is not 
shared by a number of social historians (e.g., Bury 
1932; Harris 1968, 1974; Carneiro 1967, 1974; and 
Nisbet 1980), who accept Spencer's own assessment 
of his impact on evolutionary theory (see especially 
Harris 1968: 123- 128). Spencer's most ardent 
defenders grant him, in addition, a better grasp 
than Darwin himself of the bearing of "Darwinian" 
principles of evolutionary progress on the nature of 
general evolutionary change. Obviously, they 
accept Spencer's definition of evolution as 
progressive change from simple to complex. So the 
straw-man argument of anti-evolutionists is not 
entirely of their own manufacture. It is a fact, 
however, that defining evolution as progressive 
change would strike most modern evolutionary 
biologists as misleading and simplistic. 
In his autobiography, Spencer (1904) declared 
that he had formulated the theory of natural 
selection in an essay published in 1852, seven years 
before Darwin's Origin appeared. True, he 
acknowledged that in restricting his arguments to 
human populations he had failed to operationalize 
selection as a mechanism that could explain the 
origin of all species. But he deemed his argument 
conceptually similar to Darwin's, and he made his 
case sufficiently convincing to others so that he 
succeeded in gaining wide acceptance for it, even 
today--although not among biologists. 
There is a marked disparity between the view, 
held by many biologists, that Spencer contributed 
little to the development of Darwinian evolutionary 
theory and the view, held by some social historians, 
that Spencer was a central figure in its develop- 
ment, At the core of these disparate evaluations 
are very different perceptions of Darwin's own 
contribution to evolutionary theory. One cannot 
fully understand Spencer's fall from grace in 
biological circles unless one understands twentieth 
century concepts of evolutionary progress. It is in 
his view of biological progress that Darwin 
departed most dramatically from Spencer. Darwin's 
vision departed from that of Spencer in a manner 
that foreshadowed twentieth century neo-Darwinian 
ambivalence toward the notion of general progress 
itself. 
SPENCER'S PROGRESS 
Herbert Spencer was an evolutionary progres- 
sionist. Underlying his vision of evolutionary 
progress was a defense of individualism that was to 
emerge, under the label Social Darwinism, most 
clearly in the laissez-faire economics of the 1880s. 
Spencer opposed all forms of socialism as 
unwarranted political interference with individual 
freedom. His grandiose theory of social evolution 
posited that the "right," or most "fit," people would 
survive and that order and perfection would be 
achieved through natural evolution. 
Spencer's idea of fitness was imbued with 
nineteenth century notions of desirability and value, 
and it is impossible to read Spencer today without 
noticing the extent to which social prejudices 
affected his interpretation of progress. Eggs-the 
sex cells produced by women--could not play any 
role in the coordination of development; develop- 
ment must be directed instead by sperm, which 
must therefore figure more prominently in 
evolutionary progress! Australian aborigines must 
have body proportions that are less advanced--less 
'heterogeneous"--than those of Europeans! One 
biographer commented that we now approach 
Spencer as we might approach an "outmoded 
encyclopedia, ... not expecting to find what is right, 
but rather to review errors that were plausible a 
century ago" (Kennedy 1978:7). It was, however, 
precisely those errors that made him so attractive 
to his elite European contemporaries. He told 
them what they wanted to hear; he built a dream--a 
Victorian gentleman's vision of the best of all 
possible worlds. And then he assured his readers 
that this dream had to come true. In fact, his 
Utopia was very like that constructed by anti- 
evolutionists, except that the latter insist that God 
must intervene, and Spencer insisted that progress 
was guaranteed by natural law. 
From early in his career, Spencer defended the 
inevitability of progress. Common features of 
diverse manifestations of progress must describe a 
law that could be used to predict the future. Since 
perfection, as Spencer imagined it, was not manifest 
in his own world, all of the steps leading to 
perfection could not have occurred yet. They 
would in time, however, for "progress is not an 
accident, not a thing within human control, but a 
beneficent necessity" (191060). 
In an essay called "Progress: Its Law and 
Cause," Spencer's general doctrine of evolution 
made its first appearance. The concept of selection 
was not discussed in it, although this essay was 
published five years after Spencer had first 
introduced selection as a proximate cause of 
progress. Indeed, biological evolution was of little 
concern in this essay. It merely provided one, not 
terribly strong, example of progressive evolution. 
Evolution comprised all change from simple to 
complex--all progress, in other words. Progress 
could be manifested in any of numerous forms: in 
the development of an individual; in the geological 
development of the earth; in the history of society, 
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government, manufacture, commerce, language, 
literature, science, and art; and in the fossil record 
of biological life. Spencer sought a law that would 
guarantee the ultimate attainment of human 
happiness, and he thought he found it in von Baer's 
"law" of ontogenetic development. Organic 
progress comprised change from "homogeneous to 
heterogeneous," from simple to complex, from the 
uniform germ cell to the differentiated adult 
organism. "From the earliest traceable cosmical 
changes down to the latest results of civilization," 
Spencer wrote, "we shall find that the 
transformation of the homogeneous into the 
heterogeneous, is that in which progress essentially 
consists" (Spencer 1910:lO). 
Once Spencer had formulated his law of all 
development, he needed to find a principle that 
would produce heterogeneity from homogeneity. 
since progress or evolution comprised more than 
biological transformation, this principle could not 
be strictly biological. Furthermore, since it was 
widely held in the nineteenth century that general 
laws of development could be found that applied 
across all disciplines, there was no need to 
construct a biological explanation for biological 
change. This is why Spencer invoked physical 
forces to explain evolutionary change, and this is 
one of the reasons why natural selection was 
always, to Spencer, a secondary cause of 
evolutionary change. Spencer argued that 
increasing complexity was the necessary 
consequence of active forces, their persistence and 
cumulative effects. Thus, he believed, trees develop 
from seeds, animals develop from fertilized ova, 
and European limb proportions develop from those 
of Australian aborigines, all because of "disturbing 
forces." Biological modifications are brought about 
by "mechanical conditions" or  "muscular forces." 
Such modifications are transmitted to offspring 
through the inheritance of acquired characteristics-- 
a notion compatible with the idea that the 
cumulative effects of force must persist. 
Today this seems a naive and superficial 
argument, especially in light of the specific 
examples this law was supposed to explain. (Do 
"forces actingn really predict that Australian 
aborigines will have "less heterogeneous" body 
proportions--whatever that means--than 
Europeans?) But to Spencer, both the 
generalization that all progress consists of the 
transformation of the simple into the complex and 
the explanation that this is due to the persistence 
of force were central truths. From physical 
principles--the "indestructibility of matter," the 
"continuity of motion," the "integration of matter," 
and the "dissipation of motionn--Spencer attempted 
to derive all laws of change, and, in so doing, to 
prove the inevitability of human perfection. 
Thus a set of physical principles became 
Spencer's First Principles (1862); they predicted 
universal parallel transformations. When, during 
Spencer's lifetime, it became evident that germ cells 
are not homogeneous in structure and chemical 
composition, he was nevertheless reluctant to 
relinquish his law of universal development. This 
concept was the key to his First Principles--and it 
was from laws of the highest order of generality 
that he derived all other generalities. The doctrine 
of universal transformation was part and parcel 
with Spencer's definition of evolution. Matter 
tends to become integrated, Spencer wrote; motion 
to become dissipated. Put matter and motion 
together and you get greater coherence of 
individual parts, and more parts. Using such 
arguments Spencer could make the division of 
labor in society comparable to the multiplication of 
cells in an individual organism, or to the 
diversification of all biological life (each involved 
more "individual" parts). He  wrote: 
Evolution is an integration of matter and 
concomitant dissipation of motion; during 
which the matter passes from a relatively 
indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a 
relative definite, coherent heterogeneity, 
and during which the retained motion 
undergoes a parallel transformation [cited 
in Elliot 1970:244]. 
This definition of evolution is decidedly 
nonbiological. In Spencer's world, biological 
evolution was but one manifestation of a broader 
process of change. And selection was but one 
process that would aid the development of life on 
earth. Darwin constructed a theory of change by 
natural selection, according to which general 
progress was one possible consequence; Spencer 
constructed a theory of progress according to which 
selection, and indeed, biological evolution, were 
possible consequences. 
SPENCER'S SELECTION 
Use inheritance, Spencer's preferred mechanism 
of biological evolutionary change, was rejected by 
most biologists after the publication of Weismann's 
germ theory in 1883. Darwin had accepted use 
inheritance, although he defended natural selection 
as the primary mechanism of evolutionary change. 
Spencer, on the other hand, was never an ardent 
defender of natural selection; and after the 
publication of Weismann's germ theory threatened 
to destroy the foundation of his own preferred 
mechanism of evolutionary change, he intensified 
his critique of selection and elevated use 
inheritance to a primacy that even he had not 
advocated before (Kennedy 1978). Only late in his 
life did Spencer claim priority for having discovered 
natural selection in human populations, and only 
then did he lament having overlooked the "obvious 
corollary" that selection must be a "universally- 
operative factor in the development of [all] species" 
(1904:451): 
It seems strange that, having long 
entertained a belief in the development of 
species through the operation of natural 
causes, I should have failed to see that the 
truth [I] indicated [in some passages of 
"Theory of Population"] ... must hold, not of 
mankind only, but of all animals; and must 
everywhere be working changes among 
them. If when human beings are subjected 
by pressure of population to a competition 
for the means of subsistence, it results that 
on the average the tendency is for the select 
of their generation to survive, so, little by 
little, producing a better-adapted type; then 
the like must happen with every other kind 
of living thing similarly subjected to the 
"struggle for existence." And if so, this 
must in all cases cause a modification 
[Spencer l904:45 11. 
The passage from "A Theory of Population, 
Deduced from the General Law of Animal 
Fertility" that, Spencer said, described natural 
selection reads as follows: 
The effect of pressure of population, in 
increasing the ability to maintain life, and 
decreasing the ability to multiply, is not a 
uniform effect, but an average one .... All 
mankind in turn subject themselves more or 
less to the discipline described; they either 
may or may not advance under it; but, in 
the nature of things, only those that do 
advance under it eventually survive .... 
Families and races whom this increasing 
difficulty of getting a living which excess of 
fertility entails, does not stimulate to 
improvements in production--that is, to 
greater mental activity--are on the high 
road to extinction; and must ultimately be 
supplanted by those whom the pressure 
does so stimulate .... And here, indeed, 
without further illustration, it will be seen 
that premature death under all its forms, 
and from all its causes, cannot fail to work 
in the same direction. For as those 
prematurely carried off must, in the average 
of cases, be those in whom the power of 
self-preservation is the least, it unavoidably 
follows that those left behind to continue 
the race, are those in whom the power of 
self-preservation is the greatest--are the 
select of their generation [Spencer 
1852:266-2671. 
"Theory of Population" was one of several early 
Spencerian statements about the nature of progress. 
It concerned the implications for human progress 
of the so-called law of animal fertility. But rather 
than failing to generalize or to consider organisms 
in general, this essay begins'with the simplest 
organisms and attempts to generalize to humans. 
Darwin's theory of natural selection is not there, 
not because of an oversight, not because the focus 
was too narrow, not because Spencer believed the 
inheritance of acquired characteristics sufficient to 
explain organic evolution; but because, conceptu- 
ally, Spencer's selection was different from that of 
Darwin. It would be impossible to derive 
Darwinian selection from it. 
That is not to say that there are no similarities 
between Darwin's concept of natural selection and 
the selection Spencer described in "Theory of 
Population." Both Darwin and Spencer developed 
a principle of selection based on Malthus. Both 
were members of a community of scholars writing 
about the so-called population problem--Malthus's 
supreme dilemma and "justification" for social 
injustice (Chase 1980). The phrases struggle for life, 
self-preservation, competition, and overproduction 
were not concerns of Darwin alone, but of an 
entire academic world to which both Darwin and 
Spencer belonged. Like Darwin, Spencer used 
competition and overproduction to make an 
argument for rather than against evolutionary 
change. Both Spencer and Darwin reversed the 
prevailing view that the struggle for life preserved 
the integrity of species by eliminating the unfit 
(contrast Darwin and Spencer with William Kirby, 
John Crawfurd, and, indeed, Malthus himself; see 
Jones 1980).' But the similarities between 
Spencer's and Darwin's original formulations of 
selection end here. 
Spencer's law of animal fertility was, like many 
other Spencerian laws, a loose empirical 
generalization based on a limited and carefully 
selected sample of observations. Specifically, it was 
based on the observation that simple organisms, 
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such as bacteria, reproduce very rapidly and in 
great quantities but produce short-lived offspring; 
whereas more complex organisms, such as mam- 
mals, tend to produce few offspring, each of which 
has greatly enhanced powers of self-preservation 
and therefore greatly enhanced chances of surviving 
for a long period of time. From this Spencer 
derived a law that he took as characterizing the 
Great Chain of Being-that there is an inherent 
necessary opposition between individuation (that is, 
self-preservation, complexity, coordination, capacity 
for self-regulation) and reproduction (that is, 
fertility). In order to advance along the ladder of 
life, Spencer thought, there must be some sacrifice 
in the realm of reproduction. Thus, Spencer 
believed that it was not possible to advance in the 
realm of individuation without simultaneously 
experiencing a decline in fertility. (A similar 
though not identical argument was offered in his 
Principles of Biology, Vol. 11, 1867.) 
Spencer liberally applied his law to a variety of 
biological and social phenomena. For example, 
sperm cells provided Spencer with one arena for a 
battle between individuation and reproduction. 
Since, Spencer thought, eggs could contain only 
material "to be coordinated," sperm must be 
responsible for coordinating the growth of the 
nervous system and thus must possess remarkable 
powers of individuation. Such powers could be 
enhanced only at the expense of reproduction--that 
is, decreased production of sperm cells. Spencer 
argued that in sustaining this natural antagonism 
between reproduction and individuation, sperm 
cells must strike a delicate balance, sacrificing 
fertility for greater efficiency in individuation. 
Another application of the law of animal 
fertility was to the problem of perfection in human 
social and economic life. It was in this section of 
his essay that Spencer erected selection as a 
proximate cause of progress. 
Spencer argued here that humans had not yet 
achieved ultimate perfection since human 
populations were still plagued by excess fertility. 
As long as excess fertility existed, there was room 
for its reduction; and as long as there was room for 
reduced fertility, increased individuation could 
occur. It was in this sense that Spencer posited 
excess fertility as a problem for human populations, 
and it was in this sense that he viewed population 
pressure as a "proximate cause of progress" (or of 
individuation). Stated in this way, Spencer's early 
formulation of selection looks very non-Darwinian, 
and also very nineteenth century. And as might be 
anticipated, Spencer envisioned that this increased 
individuation would be manifested in human 
anatomy as well as in social behavior. 
The argument went like this: Population 
pressure poses a problem whose solution necessi- 
tates technological or industrial advance--that is, 
improvements in the skills of self-preservation. 
One improves one's own and one's family's chance 
of survival (self-preservation) by increasing 
industrial or agricultural production (most definite- 
ly not by increasing fertility). Premature death 
comes to those who fail to contend in this way with 
the problem of population pressure. Thus, the 
proximate cause of progress is excess fertility. 
Given excess fertility, there is necessarily competi- 
tion, and given competition, there is necessarily 
improvement in skill by selection. Those males "in 
whom the power of self-preservation is the greatest" 
will be "the select of their generation." In other 
words, they will exhibit a prescribed and predictable 
set of improvements--prescribed and predictable 
not because selection is operating under specific 
environmental conditions, but because of a law that 
requires all improvement to be unidirectional. 
It was only after Spencer had described all of 
the presumed manifestations and ramifications of 
individuation that he felt ready to predict future 
change. The "select of their generation" would 
have bigger brains, would have heightened senses of 
morality, and would be less fertile than those in 
whom the "power of self-preservation" was the 
least. "So long as there is pressure on the means of 
subsistence," Spencer wrote (1852:267), "further 
mental development must go on, and further 
diminution of fertility must result." 
This rather startling conclusion is but a short 
step from the next, and perhaps least Darwinian, of 
Spencer's deductions--that selection generated by 
population pressure or the struggle for life would 
be the vehicle of its own eradication. Selection, as 
originally formulated by Herbert Spencer, was a 
self-destructive process! 
Spencer reasoned that intellectual, moral, and 
physical improvement could not accrue forever, just 
as fertility cannot decrease ad infiniturn, since such 
a decrease would threaten the extinction of the 
population. But according to Spencer's law, with- 
out a concomitant decrease in fertility there could 
be no progress in the realm of individuation. "For 
a cessation in the decrease of fertility implies a 
cessation in the development of the nervous 
system." Spencer did not see this as a problem, 
however, since 
this implies that the nervous system has 
become fully equal to all that is demanded 
of it--has not to do more than is natural to 
it .... In the end the obtainment of 
subsistence will require just that kind and 
that amount of action needful to perfect 
health and happiness [Spencer 1852:267]. 
Spencer believed that, once the human 
population produced only enough offspring to 
sustain itself, Utopia would have emerged. There 
would be no further suffering, no further evil. 
Virtually no youth would succumb to disease or to 
accident, and the powers of self-preservation of 
those born into this world would be as perfect as 
possible. The population would have increased to 
the maximum possible to comfortably people the 
globe. Inferior, lazy races would have disappeared, 
and no further evolution would be possible. Here 
was the making of the perfect human type--one that 
satisfied the prejudices of the Victorian world. 
Interestingly, Spencer's conclusion that 
decreased fertility would solve Malthus's population 
problem was not unique. Indeed, as Nisbet (1980) 
has shown, Malthus himself had come to this 
conclusion in late versions of his famous essay. 
Perhaps Spencer's most striking distinction was that 
he couched his argument in terms of a biological 
Iaw--of necessity rather than opportunity. This was 
in part why Spencer was so esteemed in the 
nineteenth century, when every scholar's goal was 
to discover those few laws from which, presumably, 
everything could be logically derived. But it did 
not make Spencer's essay strikingly Darwinian; 
Darwin did not hang selection on a law of 
necessary antagonism between individuation and 
reproduction. 
The wide acceptance of Spencer's argument of 
scholarly priority is most curious, particular in light 
of the proclivity of Darwinian biologists to equate 
selection with differential reproduction and to 
consider increases in fertility and fecundity 
advantageous. Spencer's early concept of selection 
was in some ways antithetical to Darwinian 
selection as currently understood. 
Of course Spencer's selection did involve 
differential survival--the differential survival of 
acquired traits. To Spencer, there was no question 
that greater industriousness, larger brains, and less 
inclination to reproduce, would be inherited. The 
conscious choice to work hard in the face of 
population pressure would effect behavioral and 
physical changes that would be passed on through 
use inheritance to offspring. Spencer never 
considered it possible that people with many 
offspring could be the "select of their generation." 
The "select" must be disinclined toward the physical 
act of reproduction itself. To the "select," 
pleasurable activities would be those of the mind. 
In summary, when Spencer wrote that 
population pressure is the cause of progress, he 
meant, first, that it is the problem that humans 
must strive to overcome; and second, that it is the 
mechanical cause of a competitive struggle that 
must result in differential survival. Difficulty in 
getting a living stimulates improvements in 
industrial and agricultural production. Individuals 
strive toward self-preservation. Those who seek to 
solve the population problem by improving their 
own lot through hard work will succeed, and their 
success will be manifested in biological changes that 
are inherited. Their offspring will inherit larger 
brains, greater skill, intelligence, self-regulation, 
and self-satisfaction, as well as reduced fertility! 
Spencer's selection was far more deterministic 
than that which Darwin was to propose seven years 
later. How could Spencer's selection explain 
variation in human pigmentation or the shape of 
the beak of finches? Spencer did not frame 
selection as a vehicle of variable, adaptive change. 
He had not merely failed to extend his concept 
beyond humans; he had failed to apply it to  human 
adaptive diversity. 
Even late in his lifetime, after he had 
incorporated a more Darwinian concept of 
selection into his work, Spencer clung to a vision of 
unilinear progress. Selection was always a means 
to achieve supreme order and stability in human 
society. It was always a means toward perfecting 
the human type. 
To his credit, in his Autobiography, Spencer 
(1904) acknowledged his failure to consider 
adaptive variation; he realized that here lay the key 
to Darwin's resolution of the population problem 
and particular formulation of selection. The fact 
remains, however, that in 1852, Spencer had not 
devised a concept that could account for adaptive 
diversity--human or otherwise. This was, of course, 
Darwin's central concern in his Origin of Species. 
DARWIN'S GENIUS 
It may seem odd to say that one can recognize 
genius in ambivalence. Yet skepticism is the stuff 
of scientific advance, and it is all the more impres- 
sive when it challenges a belief that has become 
entrenched in the scholarly literature. Such was 
the belief in progress. When Darwin wrote The 
Origin of Species, the belief in progress dominated 
far more than the discipline of biology; it dominat- 
ed all fields of natural, social, and physical science, 
as well as the humanities. The second half of the 
nineteenth century was the heyday of the idea of 
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progress (Bury 1932; Nisbet 1980). Charles Darwin 
was a product of that age. He was certainly an 
evolutionary progressionist, but he was also one of 
the most severe critics of the "law" of progressive 
development. This is why Gould (1977:13) has 
maintained that "an explicit denial of innate pro- 
gression is the most characteristic feature 
separating Darwin's theory of natural selection 
from other nineteenth century evolutionary 
theories." Darwin only weakly defended the best 
accepted standards of overall advance in 
organization. He found problematic both von 
Baer's criterion of increased complexity and Milne 
Edwards's criterion of increased specialization in 
function of organs. 
The difficulty Darwin experienced in accepting 
any single standard of progress in the biological 
world stemmed from his acute sense that the pat- 
tern of diversification does not describe a simple 
pattern of increase in any one thing, and also from 
his awareness that the theory he had developed did 
not require it. Natural selection was Darwin's 
agent of progress; yet he had defined it in such a 
way that progress could not be a necessary conse- 
quence. Natural selection was a mechanism where- 
by fitness--an organism's adaptation to a particular 
environment-is enhanced. In other words, natural 
selection was, to Darwin, an agent of local adapta- 
tion. Furthermore, although Darwin left the causes 
of variation undefined, he was explicit in his belief 
that natural selection must work with variation 
produced by some process independent of selection 
itself. If beneficial variants are not somehow a 
priori produced; or  if there is no modification in 
the physical or biotic environment providing an 
incentive (or pressure) for improvement; or, finally, 
if certain existing complex adaptations are no 
longer needed in a changed or newly occupied envi- 
ronment; then it follows that progress may not 
occur. It is even possible that retrogression in the 
scale of organization will occur. In a nutshell, if 
different environments require different adapta- 
tions, Darwin's theory provided no clear standard 
by which an organism from one environment could 
be judged superior to an organism from another. 
Indeed, it provided no clear standard by which they 
could be compared. Darwin wrote: 
We can see, bearing in mind that all 
organic beings are striving to increase at a 
high ratio and to seize on every unoccupied 
or less well occupied place in the economy 
of nature, that it is quite possible for 
natural selection gradually to fit a being to 
a situation in which several organs would 
be superfluous or useless; in such cases 
there would be retrogression in the scale of 
organization [Darwin 1963: 1051. 
Also: 
On our theory the continued existence of 
lowly forms offers no difficulty; for natural 
selection, or the survival of the fittest, does 
not necessarily include progressive 
development--it only takes advantage of 
such variations as arise and are beneficial to 
each creature under its complex relations of 
life [1963:105]. 
By asking how much the level of organization 
had actually tended to advance, Darwin converted 
the general truth of progress into a hypothesis 
demanding more data for verification. H e  acknowl- 
edged that his hypothesis that organization on the 
whole should advance under natural selection had 
not yet been adequately tested, and he admitted 
practical difficulties in testing it. There were, for 
example, difficulties in ranking "highn and "low" 
when comparing biota from different areas or from 
different times, or in comparing organisms exhib- 
iting very different organizational plans. "Who will 
decide," wrote Darwin (1963, p. 337), "whether a 
cuttle fish be higher than a bee?" In their own 
worlds, barnacles, parasites, and earthworms are as 
perfect as are horses, falcons, and people. What's 
more, Darwin marshalled evidence to show that 
general progress had not, indeed, universally 
occurred, and that the pattern of diversification 
produced by natural selection was hard to interpret 
in terms of a simple polarity between low and high 
or simple and complex. Darwin went so far as to 
say that if one insists that his theory demands that 
progress must occur, one is then forced to  consider 
his theory falsified! Progress (in the sense of 
overall advance in organization) is a prediction, but 
not a necessary consequence, of natural selection. 
Perfection in a local context and overall advance in 
organization are not the same thing. Under 
specific environmental conditions, overall advance 
in organization could not be expected to occur. 
Darwin's theory was an optimization theory 
based on context-specific competition. He talked 
about natural selection producing increasingly 
complex organisms, or increasingly reproductively 
successful organisms, or organisms with increasingly 
bigger brains. But he left only one criterion for 
judging overall fitness--competitive success within 
specific environmental contexts. The metaphors he 
used, including those he borrowed from Spencer 
(most notably "survival of the fittest"), reflected his 
concern for competitive success as the criterion 
whereby fitness could be ranked. As modern non- 
Darwinian biologists are quick to point out (for 
example, Ho and Saunders 1979), ordering by 
fitness, thus conceived, breaks down whenever 
competition cannot be an issue. Suppose, for 
instance, that a species moves into a new niche or a 
new environment in order to avoid competition, 
and that this move is the basis of a new success. 
When two organisms do not compete it is difficult 
if not impossible to evaluate their relative fitness. 
Of course, species are also affected by the 
abiotic conditions of life. If an organism is known 
to do poorly in a particular environment, it can be 
said to be poorly adapted to that environment, 
whether or not other species with which it might 
compete are present. Any assessment of relative 
fitness depends on the specific abiotic as well as 
biotic environment. A species that has a clear 
competitive advantage over another species may 
lose that advantage completely in a different 
environment. It follows that no single quantity 
increases as a result of natural selection, and that 
one cannot even apply Darwin's theory to make 
predictions of relative advantage without first 
specifying a complex set of conditions to which the 
organisms must adapt (see Maynard Smith 1978; 
Bock 1979). 
So Darwin's theory allows one to define and 
predict relative fitness under specific local 
conditions, but not to define fitness in a global 
sense as a quantity tending to increase during 
evolution. It is possible that there simply is no one 
quantity that increases in such a manner--at least 
not as a consequence of Darwin's mechanism of 
natural selection. Still, based on the premise that 
modern organisms have beaten their predecessors 
in the game of survival, and on the assumption that 
time's arrow will be reflected in improvements 
representing the cumulative effects of competition, 
numerous scholars have tried to define such a 
quantity. The results have been equivocal, as we 
shall see. 
What is remarkable about Darwin is that he 
was willing to defend evolution without 
simultaneously defending a progress-dependent 
vectorial view of the universe. The reluctance of 
many modern biologists to define evolution as 
anything more than constant adjustment of lineages 
to changing environmental conditions, their 
unwillingness to recognize more than net progress 
of different sorts in different evolutionary lineages, 
and their general refusal to equate evolution with 
progress of any sort, are direct consequences of the 
Darwinian paradigm. Modern neo-Darwinists do 
not depart radically from Darwin's ambivalence 
toward the concept of overall evolutionary progress. 
MODERN INTERPRETATIONS OF PROGRESS: 
NEO-DARWINISM 
Progress does not have a single interpretation 
in the neo-Darwinian paradigm. Most neo- 
Darwinists agree that there is no standard by which 
uniform progress can be said to have taken place 
(Simpson 1974; Ayala 1974, 1977). Evolution is 
too erratic. But neo-Darwinists also believe that 
net progress has occurred, and that progress can 
only be understood in a Darwinian context. 
Progress is not possible without selection, although 
selection does not necessarily result in progress. 
Selection, while not directed, gives direction to 
evolution. That direction results either in 
adjustment to local conditions (perfection only in 
the sense of better local adaptation), or in 
improved capacity to compete under a variety of 
circumstances (perfection in a more general sense). 
Directional evolution is said to occur without 
progress if, despite long sustained directional 
change, terminal members of a lineage are not 
"better off in some general sense than early 
members of the same lineage. Spatial clines may 
exhibit adaptive fine-tuning whereby individuals at 
opposite ends of a geographic range are adapted to 
entirely different environments, but individuals at 
neither end are more progressive than the others. 
Similarly, temporal gradients may exhibit the 
same kind of directional change without general 
improvement. General progress is said to occur 
when later members of a lineage acquire true 
improvements. There have been repeated attempts 
to find simple quantities that may improve in such 
a manner as a result of natural selection. Such a 
quantity may be defined as a function of 
optimization processes or as a consequence of long- 
term competition. Fitness will be optimized during 
natural selection; therefore, one has to discover the 
properties of greater fitness. What has emerged is 
a multifocal definition of general progress. There 
are many standards of progress, and all of them are 
believed to accrue as a function of natural 
selection. Competition will result in broader 
ranges of adaptive response to adversity; it will 
result in increased homeostasis, improved potential 
for reproductive success, increased complexity, 
increased efficiency in the utilization of limited 
resources, and so on. Even adaptive diversification 
has been attributed to natural selection (although 
clearly other factors are also involved, at least in 
the multiplication of lineages). 
What has also emerged in the neo-Darwinian 
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literature is the sense that none of these standards 
is entirely satisfactory as a criterion for general 
progress, because increases in a given direction will 
not always give species a competitive advantage. 
Take, for example, increases in the range of 
adaptive response. Generalists display adaptive 
flexibility; yet when resource diversity is low, a 
generalist adaptive strategy is not successful-- 
specialists are better able to utilize the ubiquitous, 
if monotonous, available foods. Similarly, 
complexity is not always beneficial. Simple 
parasites do quite well by taking advantage of the 
vital life services provided by their hosts. Greater 
metabolic efficiency may not be a good standard 
under all conditions; one can easily envision 
circumstances under which new metabolically 
expensive adaptations will be selected in order to 
attain some other advantage. It seems that even 
general criteria of progress cannot be applied 
universally. Modern Darwinism recognizes, just as 
Darwin did, that the theory of natural selection 
implicitly prohibits a single best criterion for 
progressive change from being formulated. 
Standards of progress appear ad hoc or axiological. 
George Gaylord Simpson has stated this 
eloquently, concluding a review article entitled "The 
Concept of Progress in Organic Evolution" with the 
following observations: 
Some organisms are better than their 
ancestors or than some of their relatives at 
doing certain things in certain ways. Some 
oysters are better at being oysters than their 
ancestors. Some trees are better at living 
on.mountain tops than others. We are 
doubtless better at being men than 
Australopithecus was, although I go along 
with Haldane far enough to believe that 
monkeys are better at being monkeys than 
we would be even if we tried. It is also true 
that sometimes whole groups have been 
carried by selection to a point where their 
great expansion into various adaptive zones 
became possible, a progressive feature of 
evolution .... That is the explanation, in 
unduly broad terms, of the spread of 
dominant groups from time to time. 
With such examples it is perfectly rea- 
sonable to say that improvement has 
factually occurred and that there is 
therefore evolutionary progress. The 
progress is, however, ad hoc in every case. 
Our ancestors' progress was not the 
oysters', the trees', or the monkeys', nor was 
theirs ours. Since we are humans, after all, 
the most interesting and important progress 
is progress toward us, but let us not 
mistake this for a general phenomenon. 
Probably the most important result of 
this somewhat dispersive inquiry is negative: 
there is no innate tendency toward 
evolutionary progress and no one, overall 
sort of such progress. We cannot sit back 
and assume that natural selection will lead 
to progress for us, or for anything else. We 
cannot even assume that prolongation of 
past progress would continue to be progress 
[Simpson 197450-511. 
Francisco Ayala (1977516) draws a similar con- 
clusion: "Organisms are more or less progressive 
depending on what criterion of progress is used. 
By certain criteria, flowering plants are more pro- 
gressive than many animals." Homo is only the 
"most perfect" of organisms 'if one chooses one's 
standard of progress accordingly. But such a stan- 
dard as "the ability to perceive the environment, 
and to integrate, coordinate and react flexibly to 
what is perceived ... is not necessarily better or worse 
than other criteria of progress" (Ayala 1977516). 
So progress is ambiguous in a neo-Darwinian 
context, and neo-Darwinism simultaneously claims 
and disavows it. Neo-Darwinists certainly do not 
equate progress with evolution, as some anti- 
evolutionists have claimed. Even if we could find 
some one quantity that increases with time as a 
result of natural selection, we would have to assess 
the relative importance of that increase as opposed 
to other kinds of evolutionary change before evolu- 
tion could be equated in any sense with progressive 
change. 
Recently the adequacy of neo-Darwinism to 
explain different forms of progress has been 
challenged on other grounds. Progress has not only 
diverse meanings, but also diverse causal 
mechanisms. 
MODERN INTERPRETATIONS OF PROGRESS: 
NON-DARWINIAN FRAMEWORKS 
Perhaps the least radical of the challenges 
comes from proponents of the theory of punctuated 
equilibria (Eldredge and Gould 1972; Stanley 1975, 
1979; Gould and Eldredge 1977; Gould 1980; 
Eldredge 1985a,b). Their argument is less a 
challenge to the importance of Darwinian selection 
as a driver of evolutionary trends than it is a 
challenge to the primacy of the narrower neo- 
Darwinian reformulation of selection--that is, 
"natural selection" as mathematized and 
conceptualized by the founders of the "Modern 
Synthesis." The "Modern Synthesis" refers to the 
melding of Darwinism and particulate ("beanbag") 
genetics2 that occurred in the 1930s largely through 
the efforts of geneticists such as Haldane, Fisher, 
Wright, and Dobzhansky (see Fisher 1930; 
Dobzhansky 1937; Mayr 1942). 
The growth and acceptance of beanbag genetics 
gave new meaning to natural selection and to 
evolution in general; evolution was now temporal 
change in gene frequency, brought about through 
the differential survival and reproduction of 
individuals belonging to single species. Selection 
operating at higher levels (for example, among 
breeding populations or whole species) was deemed 
unimportant, despite the fact that Darwin had 
considered competition at multiple levels very 
much a part of the normal operation of natural 
selection. The neo-Darwinian focus on individuals 
developed not directly from Darwin's work but 
from the synthesis of Darwinian naturalism and 
population genetics. Neo-Darwinism was a theory 
of genes which tied the ultimate survival of genes 
to the differential survival of their individual hosts. 
By the 1970s, sociobiologists--perhaps the 
staunchest, least compromising of modern 
defenders of neo-Darwinism-had begun criticizing 
the Synthesis for not taking gene theory far enough. 
To sociobiologists, selection acts at the level of 
'selfish," competitive genes and can in fact thwart 
the selfish interests of the individuals carrying them 
(viz., the evolution of all forms of altruism, which 
sociobiologists take to be genetically controlled; 
Wilson 1975; Dawkins 1976, 1986). 
Of course, one need not resort to beanbag 
genetics to justify, within a Darwinian paradigm, an 
emphasis on differential survival of individuals 
(rather than of populations or species). If 
competition is the fundamental component of 
natural selection operating at any level, then in 
order to discover the level at which natural 
selection most frequently operates we might ask 
where we would expect to find the most severe 
competition. The intensity of the "struggle for 
existence" should depend on the similarity of the 
competing individuals as well as the extent of their 
overlapping requirements. Because members of the 
same genus tend to resemble each other more than 
do members of different genera, congeneric 
competition should be greater than competition 
between species of different genera. Competition 
between individual members of the same species 
should be the most severe. 
But proponents of the theory of punctuated 
equilibria argue, contra neo-Darwinism and 
sociobiology, that long-term macroevolutionary 
trends are less a product of the differential success 
of individuals belonging to single species than of 
differential production and success of whole 
species. They claim that competition between 
individuals within species, at least during the vast 
majority of the existence of most species, will lead 
to fine adaptive adjustments but rarely to long-term 
directional trends of the sort that may be identified 
as progressive (Gould 1980; Stanley 1981; Eldredge 
1985a, 1985b, 1989). 
Punctuationalists base this claim on the 
postulate that rapid phenotypic evolution most 
often occurs under conditions that are also, 
incidentally, conducive to the generation of new 
lineages (for recent discussions, pro and con, see 
Eldredge 1985b, 1989; Vrba 1985; Hoffman 1989; 
Levinton 1989; Otte and Endler 1989; Godfrey and 
Marks 1991; Kimbel and Martin 1993). Speciation 
(the multiplication of lineages) generally occurs 
because small populations have become 
geographically isolated and genetically separated 
(e.g., due to karyotypic changes that initiate 
reproductive isolation) from their parent 
populations (White 1978; Godfrey and Marks 
1991). Furthermore, small populations facilitate 
the fixation and spread of evolutionary novelties 
generated not solely by selection but also by 
stochastic processes. 
Thus, punctuationalists argue, it is the process 
of speciation per se, and not the intensity of 
competition between individuals, that produces 
rapid morphological evolution. Indeed, it has been 
suggested that periods of relaxed (rather than 
intense) competition may occur in association with 
speciation, and that such relaxed selection may 
allow the survival of novelties that would not 
otherwise survive. Finally, punctuationalists argue 
that if the factors affecting evolutionary change 
during speciation differ from the factors affecting 
evolutionary change in whole lineages, we cannot 
predict evolutionary trends as products of the 
constant adjustment of individuals to their changing 
environments. Speciation trends (that is, trends 
associated with the differential production or 
survival of species) may have little in common with 
trends associated with the differential survival of 
individuals belonging to single species (Stanley 
1979). The relative competitive success of a species 
may ultimately depend on events that occur in a 
short period of time during its origination. This of 
course throws wide open the question of whether 
selection as used by neo-Darwinists drives 
"progressive" evolution! It seems that, to sort this 
out, we must build a hierarchical model of 
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evolution, in which selection is free to act at 
multiple levels and independent directional trends 
can be produced at  those different levels, with 
concomitant upward and downward effects (Gould 
1980; Vrba 1984; Vrba and Eldredge 1984; 
Eldredge 1985a,b). 
A more basic challenge to the tenets of neo- 
Darwinism has come from evolutionists who reject 
the notion that directional trends are the product 
of selection operating at any level (see, for 
example, Saunders and Ho 1976, 1981; Ho and 
Saunders 1979, 1984; Katz, 1982, 1987). They 
argue that classic examples of evolutionary progress 
driven by selection (including increases in 
complexity) can be understood without reference to 
either optimization theory or  competition. Instead 
they offer a theory that examines the properties of 
biological systems and the internal developmental 
constraints on the direction of evolutionary change. 
An optimization model that predicts merely that 
"advantageous" changes will occur is, at the very 
least, incomplete. 
It is the poorly understood link between the 
genome and the phenotype that so fascinates these 
investigators. While neo-Darwinism has been 
strongly influenced by population genetics, it has 
remained relatively uninfluenced by experimental 
embryology or physiological genetics (Raff and 
Kaufman 1983; Arthur 1987). Yet phenotypes arise 
only indirectly from genes; they arise through the 
interactive process of development. What is often 
missing from genetic models of phenotypic 
evolution (and also from attempts to link particular 
genetic or chromosomal structural changes to 
radical morphological change) is the bridging 
argument from physiological genetics (Godfrey and 
Marks 1991; Marks 1992). Non-Darwinian 
evolutionary biologists such as Mae-Wan Ho and 
Peter Saunders have long maintained that biologists 
cannot understand the pattern or directionality of 
evolutionary change unless more attention is paid 
to how epigenetic systems work (that is, the 
interactions between the genome, the cellular 
environment in which the genome operates, and the 
external environment in which development of the 
organism as a whole takes place). It is like trying 
to predict patterns of change in computer programs 
without understanding the language (the sub- 
routines, built-in functions, and mathematical 
identities) in which the programs are written 
(Saunders and Ho 1981). If we want to understand 
potential modifications of a computer program, Ho 
and Saunders argue, it is far more useful to learn 
the language than to build expectations based on a 
naive optimization model. (See Katz 1982, 1987, 
for an application to the problem of the evolution 
of the human brain. For a radical exposition of 
this evolutionary perspective, see Lima-de-Faria 
1988.) 
Non-Darwinian biologists insist that it is not 
sufficient to view evolution as change in gene 
frequency, or even as change in the genetic 
blueprint for development. Such a paradigm, they 
argue, fails to consider how directions of 
evolutionary change are influenced by the structure 
of the genome, genetic redundancy, and epigenetic 
interactions. Using a Darwinian predictive 
framework alone, one can imagine that changes in 
all directions are generated by "random" mutations 
and that the actual direction of change is limited 
only by competitive advantage. Individual 
competition is ubiquitous and sufficient to make 
natural selection a constant viable force, generation 
after generation. However, some field studies have 
suggested that competition may not be as important 
as Darwin and his contemporaries believed (for 
example, Wiens 1983). Perhaps competition only 
matters during resource crunches and selection 
operates intermittently in populations in general. 
Furthermore, it is abundantly clear that the 
variations on which natural selection works are not 
random. To the extent that they themselves are 
patterned and predictable, they will impart some 
directionality to evolutionary change (Ho and 
Saunders 1979; Saunders and Ho 1981; Bonner 
1982). Finally, there is the (alas! seemingly neo- 
Lamarckian) suggestion that cytoplasmic 
inheritance may be involved, at least in the initial 
stages of fixing new epigenetic pathways (Ho and 
Saunders 1979; Saunders 1985). If so (and the 
evidence for this is far from conclusive; Maynard 
Smith 1982), we have yet another agent of 
directional and progressive change (see Arthur 
1984, 1987 for a discussion of the normal operation 
of cytoplasmic inheritance). 
So progress has changed considerably from its 
nineteenth century Spencerian formulation. To 
Spencer, progress was a law of all evolutionary 
change--a law of increasing complexity that was also 
strongly associated with "fitness for the conditions 
of life" and with the attainment of the ideal type. 
Natural selection was a consequence of progress, 
although not its sole cause. To Darwin, progress 
was a consequence of natural selection, although 
not a necessary consequence. Neo-Darwinists treat 
progress essentially as Darwin did, although it has 
become more openly multifocal and, to some 
leading neo-Darwinists, ad hoc. Some non- 
Darwinian evolutionists now argue that the notion 
of increasing complexity must be divorced from the 
notion of selection or fitness. Increases in 
complexity, long believed to be a major indicator of 
progressive or advantageous change, may follow 
automatically from the way in which the epigenetic 
system operates. Complexity is probably not best 
conceived as a measure of fitness, but as a measure 
of the information content of developmental 
building instructions. It will not necessarily 
increase as a function of optimization. Phenotypic 
changes will not occur randomly, but will depend 
on the existence of alternative developmental 
pathways that can accommodate them. At issue is 
the probability of the occurrence of changes in 
different directions. 
What has been called progress, then, is quite 
probably the product of a host of factors, only one 
of which is the natural selection of individuals 
belonging to single lineages. And evolution is not 
merely progressive change! .- 
NOTES 
1. Jones (1980) points out that Spencer actually 
agreed with Kirby and Crawfurd that the struggle 
for existence preserved the type of species. But 
Spencer argued that the struggle would lead to 
constantly improving that type, and in this sense to 
"evolutionaryn change. John Crawfurd's view of the 
struggle for existence was more typical. Witness 
this statement made in an address to the 
Ethnological Society of London ten years after the 
publication of Darwin's Origin: "As to 'the struggle 
for life,' there is no doubt that, through all living 
beings, it is the weak that perish and the vigorous 
that survive. Nature, in some cases, takes some 
pains for preserving the integrity of the species but 
never for its improvement by mutation" (Crawford 
1869). 
2. The Synthesis views the genome essentially as a 
bag of independently sorting "strings of beads." 
Genes, the fundamental units of replication (DNA 
to DNA), transcription (from DNA to RNA), and 
translation (from RNA to protein), comprise the 
beads on chromosomal filamentous strings. It is 
now known that the genome is far more complex 
than this implies. For example: The units of DNA 
replication ("replicons") are not the same as units 
of RNA transcription ("genes"). Strings of DNA 
can be spliced and transcribed in alternative 
fashions; therefore the boundaries of genes are not 
stable. Most of any DNA sequence that is 
transcribed into RNA is not subsequently 
translated. There is an enormous amount of 
redundancy (repetitive elements) within the 
genome. There are also long strings of "silent" 
(non-coding) DNA both within and between genes. 
These can evolve quickly because their molecular 
structure can change without producing deleterious 
consequences for the phenotype. Only 
approximately 1% of the genome is coding. The 
genome has promotors and binding sites that are 
essential to the development and functioning of the 
organism but are never transcribed; it is not clear 
whether these should be called genes. Two 
essential questions, the relationship between 
'genes" and "characters," and the effects of the 
structure of the genome on the production of 
phenotypes, remain unsolved. Marks (1992) 
reviews the demise of "beanbag" genetics, and how 
advances in molecular genetics may affect 
evolutionary theory. 
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